Saturday, January 05, 2013

Happy New Year! 
Alles Gute für 2013, Gesundheit, Glück und Erfolg!


Thursday, January 27, 2011

Security Architecture – moving forward with an approach to outline a framework

It is a key success criteria in system development and architecture to improve and extend models, procedures and underlying frameworks. This is especially needed when it comes to cyber security of complex systems. I started recently to improve my framework for a robust security architecture. Many stakeholders tend to start with the details in such complex systems which may result in missing overall requirements and ramifications. Security in the scope of vast, distributed systems needs to be specified, designed, implemented and operated based on a solid framework – let’s call it a Security Architecture. I have seen many approaches in order to cover this tricky task. Many of them tend to be too complex. Unfortunately, complexity is not a driver for security (in contrast to simplicity). On the other hand, it’s a tough job to keep the Security Architecture for huge systems simple. Beside the need for a simple approach, transparency and clearness in the scope of Security Architecture are important attributes that should be addresses as key-objective. Security controls need to be structured and encapsulated in the relevant components of the Security Architecture in a clear and traceable manner. I prefer a structure consisting of the following main components:

  1. Security Infrastructure [ Communication and Network Security, Perimeter Security, …]
  2. System Security Services [ Access Control, Identity Management, Credential Management, Audit, Backup and Recovery, …]
  3. Application Security [ Operation Systems, Databases, Web and Application Server, SaaS, Enterprise Applications, Collaboration, and Messaging, … ]
  4. Service Security [ System Maintenance, System Operation, Change Management, Incident Management, Event Management and Forensics, Stakerholder & User Feedback, ...]
  5. Security Management [ Policies and Roles, Risk Management, Training and Awareness, Secure Coding, Design Principles, Algorithms]
The components 1-4 are the basic layers of the Security Architecture. A more vertical component is Security Management which covers and affects all the other 4 essential parts of the Security Architecture.

Wednesday, December 22, 2010

Ein gesegnetes Weihnachtsfest!




















Merry Christmas and Good Times in 2011!


Tuesday, October 19, 2010

It's autumn













River Elbe, October 2010 [webduke pics]

Friday, October 15, 2010

Security must be based on a solid (security) architecture

We can read a lot about vulnerabilities, malicious code and horrifying threat scenarios these days. And, we can also learn from all these experts how to fight this. Actually, there is nothing about war and weapons (that could help anyhow). Everything is about solid requirement management (covering security from the very beginning), a decent architecture as well as a design which addresses security seriously. Sure, the team must be qualified to handle this. Just some thoughts: A sustainable architecture is composed of discrete elements, called components. Components are the core parts of architecture. Their design and composition is essential to meet the requirement for a sustainable architecture. Beside these factors, security is another success criterion. Components must be secured in accordance with industry recommended practices. Design and implementation must adhere to security principles, design patterns and coding rules. They must be configured according to the security policies of the organization. This must apply for all components the architecture consists of. Remember the weakest link paradigm; one weak component could compromise the security of the whole architecture. Components which expose interfaces to the “outside world”, like user or communication interfaces are especially under attack or even the entry point for an intruder. This must be considered when specifying, designing and developing these entities. And, interfaces must be well-defined to support an integrative approach in order to achieve end-to-end security. The idea behind this is that a system that is composed of components must assure security when sending or receiving message from on or more component to another and even beyond the system.

Wednesday, July 28, 2010

Robustness and resilience of large distributed applications and networks

In the area of clouds and large distributed automation and control networks, we need to deal with a vast number of (growing) endpoints integrated in the (dynamic) system. It is probably a misconception to assume that all these peers could be protected comprehensively at any time. Hence, it must be an important objective that the protection of the entire system must not depend on the security status (pertaining integrity, confidentiality and availability) of each and every endpoint. In other words, a compromised node must not affect or infect the stability and protection of the entire distributed system. This shall be adressed in the system and security architecture and needs to be defined (and tested !) as a crucial requirement. A (layered) defense in depth, as a general design principle, can help to meet this requirement. In addition, intrusion detection, prevention and a quick isolation of the compromised node can help to minimize the overall impact. Plan for failure is the underlying principle to implement this efficiently. Beside these classical security precautions and controls, a robust design as well as adequate redandancy mechanisms for critical subsystems can support the system stability.